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There May be Cracks in the Foundation:
An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Current
Approach to Legislative Review of Agency
Rulemaking
Nicholas J. Johnson*
As the legislative delegation of power to administrative agencies
has grown over recent decades, so have calls for controls on agencies'
exercise of that power and particularly for controls on agency
rulemaking. In response, various state legislatures have introduced a
myriad of designs introducing legislative oversight and control over
administrative regulations.1 Pennsylvania has joined these states by
offering a means of legislative review of agency rulemaking in the
form of the Regulatory Review Act of 1989 (Act 19).'
Pursuant to the Act, the Pennsylvania Legislature created an
entity called the Independent Regulatory Review Commission (Com-
mission) and assigned to the Commission the task of reviewing ad-
ministrative regulations. Upon review, the Commission is to make a
recommendation to special House and Senate Standing Committees
(also established by the Act), that the regulation should be approved
or disapproved. 3
Final disapproval of any regulation occurs only after passage of
a concurrent legislative resolution barring the publication of the reg-
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Franklin and Marshall College. B.S.B.A. 1981
(magna cum laude), West Virginia University; J.D, 1984, Harvard Law School. Continuing
practice in Environmental and Administrative Law; Vice-President, Westar Environmental
Corporation.
I would like to thank Dr. Sidney Wise, Professor of Government, Franklin and Marshall
College, for sharing with me the materials that he has collected pertinent to this Article and
Anthony DeCusatis, Esq., my former colleague at Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, whose initial
comments concerning the Commission prompted this work.
1. See Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79-119 (1982).
2. Act 19 §§ 1-14 (1989), S.B. 1093 (June 21, 1989) [hereinafter Regulatory Review
Act]. The original rendition of the Act was passed on June 25, 1982 (P.L. 633 No. 181) with
subsequent reenactment and amendment on February 21, 1986 (P.L. 47, No. 16) and Decem-
ber 16, 1986 (P.L. 1625, No. 185).
3. The Act also anticipates that there may be disagreement between the Commission
and the Standing Committees regarding the propriety or wisdom of particular rules. Ultimate
authority over disapproval is ceded to the legislature. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at
§ 6(c).
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ulation.4 Absent such a vote, the administrative regulation is deemed
approved and is promulgated through traditional channels.5 Partly in
response to criticism that disapproval of regulations purely by legis-
lative resolution is constitutionally suspect,' especially in light of re-
cent federal and state cases prohibiting substantive lawmaking from
being undertaken through the instrument of a legislative resolution,7
the statute was reenacted to include a provision requiring present-
ment of concurrent resolutions of disapproval to the Governor for
veto or approval.8
Although the decision to permanently bar publication of a regu-
lation is left to the legislature, the Commission possesses the power
to bar temporarily the publication of proposed final form regula-
tions.9 Additionally, in the case of emergency regulations which ini-
tially may bypass the rule review structure, after 120 days the Com-
mission may suspend those regulations on its own authority pending
legislative determination of their propriety. 10
The Act creates two standards under which the Commission
may recommend disapproval of a regulation. The first is established
when the regulation is ultra vires." The second, which is reached
only if the regulation survives the first, is whether the regulation im-
poses undue costs upon the Commonwealth according to designated
criteria.' 2 Separately, the Act permits the legislature to exercise its
4. Id. §§ 6-7.
5. The standing prerequisite to agency rule promulgation is publication of the final
rule-after preliminary submission of the regulation as proposed and a period of public com-
ment-in the Pennsylvania Bulletin in accordance with section 201 of the Commonwealth
Documents Law, P.L. 769, No. 240, Act of July 31, 1968.
6. See ANNUAL REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY REVIEW COMMISSION OF 1988,
at 2 [hereinafter IRRC ANNUAL REPORT] (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
7. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa, 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987).
8. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 7(d).
9. Id. § 6(b).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 5(d).
12. Section 5(e) of the Act permits a disapproval recommendation by the Commission
upon the Commission's determination that the regulation is not in the best interests of the
public. This determination is made following an assignment of the following criteria:
(1) Economic or fiscal impacts of the regulation or rule which include the
following:
(i) Direct and indirect costs to the Commonwealth, to political sub-
divisions and to the private sector.
(ii) Adverse effects on prices of goods and services, productivity or
competition.
(iii) The nature of any reports, forms or other paperwork and the
estimated cost of their preparation by individuals, businesses and organi-
zations in the private and public sectors where such reports, forms or
other paperwork would be required.
(iv) The nature and estimated cost of any legal, consulting or ac-
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ultimate power of disapproval on the basis that the rule is ultra vires
or for any other reason, regardless of the recommendation of the
Commission. 13
The Pennsylvania design has been applauded by many as a nec-
essary and effective measure. 14 Notwithstanding these accolades
there remain blemishes and weaknesses in the structure of the stat-
ute that mark potential constitutional deficiencies. This Article at-
tempts to illuminate and examine those infirmities to determine
whether the response to rule review under Act 19 should be applause
and acceptance of the Act as a proper instrument of the State's gov-
ernmental process or instead, ?ecognition and treatment of the con-
stitutional infirmities that recommend against the Act's continuation
in its current form.
The analysis is separated into four parts. The first section exam-
ines the validity of the Commission's authority to take direct action
in light of the possibility that it may be characterized as a legislative
agency. The second section analyzes whether the Act's empower-
ment of the legislature to determine whether an agency rule is ultra
vires usurps the authority of the judiciary. The third section evalu-
ates whether the character of the legislature's disapproval of pro-
posed rules permits the criticism that the legislature has interfered
counting services which the private or public sector would incur.
(v) The impact on the public interest of exempting, or setting lesser
standards of compliance for, individuals or small businesses when it is
lawful, desirable and feasible to do so.
(2) The protection of the public health, safety and welfare, and the effect on
this Commonwealth's natural resources.
(3) The clarity, feasibility and reasonableness of the regulation to be deter-
mined by considering the following:
(i) Possible conflict with or duplication of statutes or existing
regulations.
(ii) Clarity and lack of ambiguity.
(iii) Need for the regulation or rule.
(iv) Reasonableness of requirements, implementation procedures and
timetables for the public and private sectors.
(4) Whether the regulation represents a policy decision of such a substantial
nature that it requires legislative review.
(5) Approval or disapproval by the designated standing committee of the
House of Representatives or the Senate.
13. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at §§ 5(c), 7(d).
14. See, e.g., Rescue the IRRC, Lancaster Sunday News, June 11, 1989, at A-8, col. 1;
Demise of an Agency, The Scranton Tribune, Jan. 22, 1986, at 4, col. 1; Testimony submitted
in support of reauthorization of the IRRC by the Pennsylvania Professional Insurance Agents
Association (July 10, 1986), the Pennsylvania Retailers' Associations (July 14, 1986), the
Pennsylvania Association for the Blind (July 8, 1986), Nationwide Insurance (July 15, 1986),
the Pennsylvania Farmers' Association (July 14, 1986), The Hospital Association of Pennsyl-
vania (July 3, 1986), the Pennsylvania School Boards Association (July 15, 1986), Keystone
Bituminous Coal Associations (July 15, 1986) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
But see End of IRRC Good for State, Tribune Review, Dec. 23, 1985.
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with the powers constitutionally entrusted to the executive branch of
government. The last section examines whether the rule review
under Act 19 generates antidemocratic fallout that impairs the goals
of governmental accountability and efficiency.
I. The Commission as a Legislative Agency and the Impact of that
Characterization on the Validity of its Nonadvisory Powers
A. Classification of the Commission
Section 6(b) of Act 19 empowers the Commission to tempora-
rily suspend publication of a proposed final form regulation in the
Pennsylvania Bulletin. This, in effect, bars promulgation that other-
wise would become effective, and separately, permits the Commis-
sion to temporarily invalidate emergency regulations (after they have
been in effect for 120 days)."B The characterization of the Commis-
sion is perhaps crucial in determining the constitutional validity of
these provisions. If the Commission is viewed as a traditional execu-
tive agency, the temporary bar and suspension powers can be fairly
considered valid delegations of enforcement authority.", If, however,
the design and operation of the Commission cause it to fall within
the category of a legislative agency then the validity of the Commis-
sion's exercise of these powers is questionable. 7
The existence of legislative agencies and the range of their func-
tions was recently considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Sessoms5 8 The court in Sessoms examined the
constitutionality of certain powers exercised by the Pennsylvania
15. Section 7.1 of the Act introduces another procedure that appears to fall subject to
the same criticisms applicable to the temporary bar and suspension powers. This section per-
mits the Joint Committee on Documents, at the impetus of either the Commission or one of
the Standing Committees, to "determine whether [a published or unpublished document uti-
lized by an agency] should be promulgated as an agency regulation and may order an agency
either to promulgate the document as a regulation within 180 days or to desist from the use of
the document in the business of the agency." This grant of power also appears to be subject to
the same observations and criticisms made about the propriety of legislative interpretation of
statutory meaning. See infra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
16. The legislature is embodied with the power to delegate enforcement authority to
administrative agencies of the executive branch so long as those delegated powers are con-
trolled by adequate standards that define the scope of agency authority. Tosto v. Pennsylvania
Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975).
17. A dispute over the characterization of the Commission has already surfaced. The
two sides of this dispute are evidenced in the opposing opinions of the Commonwealth Counsel
and Counsel for the Commission, which respectively support and oppose the conclusion that
the Commission is a legislative agency. See Opinion of Cmwlth. Office of General Counsel
(May 16, 1988) and Opinion of Commission Counsel (June 14, 1988) (copies of both opinions
on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
18. 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987).
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Sentencing Commission. 9 As part of its analysis, the court con-
cluded that the service of four members of the General Assembly2"
on the Sentencing Commission placed the Commission into the cate-
gory of a legislative agency.2" Acknowledging the paucity of author-
ity defining the nature and functions of legislative agencies, the court
drew fairly predictable boundaries delineating the scope of permissi-
ble legislative agency action.22
Beginning from the theory that "a 'legislative agency' has as its
purpose the furtherance of some aspect of the legislative power,"23
and placing the legislative agency in the same functional category as
a legislative committee, the court concluded that the legislative
agency could exercise no greater power than the legislature itself
holds.24  Thus, while a legislative agency legitimately may be as-
signed to exercise nonlawmaking powers entrusted to the legisla-
ture,25 it is not authorized to take actions that would be classified as
lawmaking if undertaken by the legislature. In view of these limita-
tions, the characterization of the Commission as a legislative agency
would raise serious doubts about the validity of its power to tempora-
rily bar or suspend otherwise lawfully promulgated executive agency
rules.26
Construed narrowly, Sessoms might be read to define a legisla-
19. Id.
20. Four judges and three appointees of the Governor also served on the Sentencing
Commission. Id. at 375, 532 A.2d at 780.
21. "Most significant [indicia of the commission's status] is the composition of the com-
mission." Id. at 375, 532 A.2d at 780.
22. Id. at 375-80, 532 A.2d at 780-82.
23. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 376, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (1987).
24. The court compared the functions of the legislative agency to those of a special or
standing committee of the legislature and constrained it by the same limitations that would
restrict such committees' actions. Id. at 376-78, 532 A.2d at 780-82.
25. These nonlawmaking powers may include investigation, evaluation, and classifica-
tion. See id. at 376, 532 A.2d at 780.
26. The court in fairly clear language indicated its seriousness about the idea that
agency administration of statutes is indeed executive in nature and that, short of a statutory
enactment, the legislature cannot control the executive function of rulemaking. "Notwith-
standing the view that such regulations are adopted under a delegation of the legislative power
to the agency, administrative rulemaking may be viewed as entirely executive in nature."
Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 374, 532 A.2d 775, 779 (1987) (citing Consumer
Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 473-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)). "To the extent that a statute establishes governmental policy, the legislature may
not further control the execution of that policy except through legislation." Id. at 374, 532
A.2d at 780.
This appears to directly reject the position asserted by many at the federal level that the
power exercised by executive agencies is, in part, plainly legislative and therefore the separa-
tion of powers doctrine should not be construed to so rigidly exclude the legislature from exer-
cising some direct control over those bodies. See, e.g., Immigrantion & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 484, 528 (1989).
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tive agency as one that necessarily includes legislators among its
members, thus protecting the Commission from that designation.
Such a narrow reading, however, would exclude bodies made up en-
tirely of nonlegislators that are created to assist the legislature in
some fashion and assigned the power to exercise certain nonlawmak-
ing legislative functions. Although the court's discussion of the issue
in Sessoms focused upon legislative agencies that "[include] other
[members] as well" there is no obvious reason why the legislature
could not, for example, assign its evaluation authority to a special
body of nonlegislators that might legitimately be considered a legis-
lative agency.27 That such a body could be labeled a legislative
agency would seem to turn not on its composition, but instead on its
role as an agent controlled by and designed to serve the legislature.28
If legislative control over the subject agency is the definitional
touchstone, and the absence of legislators on the Commission is not
dispositive,2 9 then there is some reason to believe that the Commis-
sion is at risk of being categorized as a legislative agency.
The five members of the Commission are chosen respectively by
the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
the House Minority Leader, the Senate Minority Leader, and the
Governor.3" This appointment power is perhaps a fair basis upon
which to conclude that the legislature is positioned to assert a signifi-
cant amount of influence and control over the functioning of the
Commission.3 1
27. The court did not rule out this possibility.
28. One might suggest that the test should focus on function rather than legislative con-
trol. However, this appears to be insufficient given that certain functions, e.g., investigation,
are shared by the branches of government. See Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation
Procedure (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342, 2 A.2d 802 (1938) (Dispute between the judiciary and the
legislature resulting from their concurrent attempt to exercise constitutionally granted powers
to respectively investigate criminal and impeachable actions committed by a governmental
officer.).
29. No members of the legislature serve on the Commission. Indeed, the enabling stat-
ute explicitly prohibits this. See Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 4(a). This prohibi-
tion has been offered as a justification for viewing the Commission as an executive rather than
a legislative agency. See Opinion of Commission Counsel, supra note 17, at 4.
30. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 4(a).
31. Whether this level of legislative control is sufficient to classify the Commission as a
legislative agency was debated in the opinions of the Commonwealth Office of General Counsel
and Counsel for the Commission which argued respectively in support of and in opposition to
the idea that the Commission is a legislative agency. See Opinion of Cmwlth. Office of General
Counsel, supra note 17, at 11-20; Opinion of Commission Counsel, supra note 17, at 5-12. The
Commission counsel argued, inter alia, that the propriety of the current appointment process
and the characterization of the Commission as an executive agency is supported by the silence
of the Pennsylvania Constitution on who shall have the power of appointment. Unlike the
federal constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution does not explicitly give the Governor the
authority to appoint officials to Commonwealth agencies. The Appointments Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution dictates only that the Governor shall appoint the "Secretary of Edu-
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It should be noted, however, that although the Commission
members are selected by legislators, no legislators sit as members,
and conditional power to remove Commission members is ceded to
the Governor."2 This places the Commission perhaps two stages
away from the precise mechanism deemed improper in Sessoms.
Whether this is a sufficient surrender of legislative control to keep
the Commission out of the legislative agency category depends sub-
stantially on how the court views the Pennsylvania Constitution's
grant of legislative authority and the degree of control achieved
through the appointment power. It would not be unreasonable to
conclude that a commissioner, selected personally by a powerful
member of the legislature, might be swayed by the wishes of that
legislator in carrying out Commission actions. Indeed, there is the
potential that this commissioner would act in a highly subordinate
fashion, especially when the professed goal of the enabling statute is
to infuse significant legislative control into the rulemaking process. If
the court is sufficiently concerned about the legislative exercise of
powers in an indirect fashion outside the boundaries of traditional
law making, it might easily conclude that the power of appointment
awards too much control to the legislature that the Commission's
powers must be limited to those legitimately exercised by legislative
agencies. Given this possibility, it is apparent that the Commission's
status as an executive agency is somewhat unsecure.
B. Limitations on the Commission's Functions Resulting from its
Classification as a Legislative Agency
If the Commission is deemed to be a legislative agency, its func-
tions and powers must be reassessed in light of the limitations that
have been prescribed for such bodies. As currently designed, the
Commission's power certainly ranges into the area of altering legal
cation and such other officers as he shall be authorized by law to appoint." PA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 8. And indeed, in at least one early case, the right of the legislature to appoint administrative
agency officials was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Smith v. Clark, 331 Pa. 405,
200 A. 41 (1938).
Despite this authority, precisely how the present court would resolve this issue remains
unclear. The status of the administrative state, and thoughts about its appropriate structure
have evolved substantially since Smith. See Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa.
225, 195 A. 90 (1937). Cf. Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. I, 331
A.2d 198 (1975). In light of the court's acknowledgement that the concept of the legislative
agency is a new one and that the definition of such bodies is at the beginning of its develop-
ment, it is reasonable to suspect that the court might view the significance of appointments in
a different light today.
32. The Governor may remove a commissioner for cause and with the approval of two
thirds of the Senate. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 4(e).
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rights and duties that the Sessoms court adopted as the standard for
distinguishing the legislature's lawmaking function from its other en-
trusted powers.33 Exercise of the temporary bar and the power to
suspend emergency regulations directly impairs the legal rights and
duties of members of the executive branch to promulgate regulations
in accordance with an agency's enabling statute,34 and, therefore, fits
squarely within the category of actions that if undertaken by the
legislature would require bicameral passage of a bill and present-
ment to the chief executive.
At the point in the process when the Commission exercises its
temporary bar or suspension power there has been no legislative en-
actment modifying or withdrawing the agency's rulemaking author-
ity.3 5 Act 19 has not placed temporary suspension conditions on all
or any specific rule promulgations, 6 but has only granted to the
Commission the power to apply those conditions at its discretion.37
33. Sessoms used the standard of alteration of legal rights and duties as a guideline for
defining legislative action that must be considered lawmaking. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516
Pa. 365, 374-75, 523 A.2d 775, 780 (1987). This approach draws from a similar standard set
forth in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chadha in which the Court invalidated a house
resolution that had "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside
the Legislative Branch." Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952
(1983).
34. For rulemaking that is considered ultra vires, there is obviously some argument con-
cerning the agency's authority to promulgate the disputed regulation. However, with respect to
a rule that is disapproved on the ground that it is simply unwise or inefficient, it is apparent
that promulgation of the rule is authorized by the enabling statute. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
35. There is some broad similarity between this power of the Commission and the judi-
cial power to issue preliminary injunctions pending adjudication of the merits of a dispute.
36. See. e.g., Consumers Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
673 F.2d 425, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Merely styling something as a condition on a grant of
power does not make that condition constitutional. Otherwise Congress could, for example,
provide that all rights and duties established by legislation are conditioned on the vote of either
house of Congress to eliminate them, thus enabling instant repeal of all statutes by simple
resolution. In effect, Congress could use 'conditions' as a means of circumventing completely
the stringent restrictions on the legislative power in Article ."). The ostensible movement of
the legislature one step from the decision may be insufficient if the decisionmaker is in reality
a conduit or a direct agent for the legislature.
37. A roughly similar issue, which arises under the Minnesota statute creating the Leg-
islative Commission for Review of Agency Rules (LCRAR), is analyzed by Professors Hamil-
ton and Prince. See Hamilton & Prince, Legislative Oversight of Administrative Agencies in
Minnesota, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223-89 (1986). The Minnesota statute differs from
Pennsylvania's Regulatory Review Act in the sense that the Minnesota Legislature allows the
LCRAR to temporarily suspend agency regulations until it has an opportunity in the next
legislative session to introduce legislation permanently barring the promulgation of the rule.
The authors observe that the suspension provision is almost certainly unconstitutional in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha. Drawing on the Court's characterization of law-
making as any action that has "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons including the Attorney General, Executive Branch Officials and Chadha,
all outside the Legislative Branch," the authors argue that the impact of the LCRAR's sus-
pension procedure is indeed legislative in nature because it impacts the duties, powers, and
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It is apparent that a process that permitted the legislature to, by
a direct order, without passage of a bill and presentment to the Gov-
ernor, prevent promulgation of a rule that is permitted under an ex-
isting statute would be improper. 8 Moreover, the fact that the ac-
tion was taken pending the consideration of a bill that addresses the
same issues would not appear to lend it any credibility.3 9 This pro-
cess would be no more valid where undertaken by a legislative
agency rather than by the legislature itself.
The Commission's power to bar or suspend otherwise lawful
regulations pending a decision of the legislature to permanently dis-
approve them, seems then to hinge on the strength of the Commis-
sion's status as a legitimate executive agency. 0 Since the Commis-
sion's hold on that designation is tenuous, there is significant reason
responsibilities of individuals serving in the executive branch. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983). Hamilton and Prince conclude that "in Minnesota
as [at the Federal level under Chadha] . . . any legislative action meant to have the effect of
law must be the product of the law-making process described in the Minnesota Constitution
and no other. Nor is it constitutionally feasible for the legislature to circumvent the constitu-
tional limitations by creating an 'executive branch' agency with rule veto or suspension power
and then providing that legislators be appointed as members of that agency." Hamilton &
Prince, supra, at 238.
In this last clause, while not using the precise nomenclature, the authors recognize the
potential for improper utilization of legislative agencies as mechanisms for circumventing the
restrictions on direct legislative action. If Pennsylvania's Commission is considered a legislative
agency, it falls subject to this same line of reasoning. The temporary bar and the suspension of
emergency regulations directly impair the legal rights and duties of members of the executive
branch to promulgate regulations in accordance with the agency's enabling statute. Although
the enabling statute attempts to award this power to the Commission, that empowerment is no
more valid than if it were entrusted to a legislative committee or subcommittee.
Finally, Hamilton and Prince acknowledge the principle argument for the validity of the
suspension power-that the power is statutory and that no suspension is permanent. Hamilton
& Prince, supra, at 238. The opinion of the Commission's counsel pressed a similar argument
with respect to Act 19. Opinion of Commission Counsel, supra note 17. Hamilton and Prince
proceed to point out that regardless of the duration of its effect, the suspension unquestionably
alters the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch within the meaning of Chadha.
Hamilton & Prince, supra, at 238-39.
This response is compelling in its application to the equivalent issue under the Regulatory
Review Act, especially in light of the fact that under the Sunset Act, P.L. 508, No. 142, Act
of December 22, 1981, various enabling statutes and agencies, including the Commission, have
only a limited duration. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1795.1-.14 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Indeed,
given the continuous power of the legislature to amend or repeal legislation, this observation
can be made about all legislative enactments and administrative agencies. Thus, the fact that
the bar and suspension powers are temporary can be viewed as an insufficient basis on which to
distinguish them from "traditional" lawmaking powers.
38. Legislative actions of this style are expressly prohibited by the Sessoms decision.
Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987).
39. Indeed, the current process can be viewed as only slightly removed from that which
was clearly invalidated in Sessoms. The principle difference being that the Commission,
through a nonlegislative process, bars publication of regulations on a temporary rather than a
permanent basis. Except for this difference in the duration of the disapproval, and assuming
the Commission is a legislative agency, the current process is structurally no different from
that which already has been invalidated.
40. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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to believe that its temporary bar and suspension powers are at risk of
being invalidated.4
II. Impact on the Judicial Function
Although much of the debate over the constitutional validity of
Act 19 has centered on presentment and the status of the Commis-
sion as a legislative agency,"2 in light of the discussion in Sessoms
and the court's adoption of the Chadha analysis, there remain other
reasons to question the Act's constitutional validity. These emanate
in part from the Act's empowerment of the legislature to engage in
functions that appear to significantly duplicate the powers of the ju-
diciary, 3 and, secondarily, from the mechanics of the "legislative"
process through which the General Assembly ultimately disapproves
a regulation.
A. Impact on the Judiciary's Power to Interpret Law
Pennsylvania's Regulatory Review Act prescribes evaluation
and disapproval of proposed regulations under two criteria. First,
that the regulation is ultra vires," and second, that it is simply un-
wise as measured against the criteria set out in section 5(e).45 It is
the first criterion that raises the initial question of the statute's con-
stitutional propriety.
By its terms, the statute authorizes interpretation of the ena-
bling statute to determine whether the rule is grounded on powers
beyond those granted to the agency. At the outset there is some
room for dispute over whether this power is exercised by the legisla-
ture (and directly subject to constitutional criticism) or by the Com-
mission (and perhaps a legitimate exercise of quasi-adjudicative
powers by a properly empowered executive agency).
It is possible to conclude that the authority to administer the
ultra vires criterion is vested in the Commission and not the legisla-
41. The objective of the temporary bar function might be achieved through an alterna-
tive mechanism that would stand on firmer constitutional footing. This instrument, sometimes
dubbed "report and wait," inserts a delay function in all rulemaking that would give the legis-
lature time to enact disapproving legislation. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 93 (describing
state statutes that combined a report and wait mechanism with pre-Chadha one or two house
legislative vetos).
42. See IRRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-3, 15-16; Opinion of Cmwlth. Office
of General Counsel, supra note 17.
43. Furthermore, if the Commission is considered a legislative agency, its authority to
undertake similar actions might be criticized along the same lines.
44. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 5(d), (e).
45. For the text of § 5(e), see supra note 12.
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ture. This view is supported by the language of sections 5(d) and (e),
which expressly charge the Commission with making the ultra vires
and efficiency determinations. Neither the legislature nor the stand-
ing committees are mentioned in this provision, but there are two
rather obvious responses to this position.
First, section 5(b)(2) of the Act separately permits the Legisla-
tive Standing Committees to make their own ultra vires determina-
tion and recommend to the full legislature a resolution disapproving
a particular rule on that basis.4 6 Moreover, when the legislature
adopts a Commission recommendation of disapproval, it may also
adopt and enforce the Commission's determination that the rule is
ultra vires.
Second, if the Commission is deemed a legislative agency there
is nothing gained from the argument that it is the Commission and
not the legislature that determines a regulation's compliance with
the enabling legislation, If, however, the Commission is considered a
proper executive agency, there is some initially perceived merit to
the argument that such bodies legitimately have and may exercise
quasi-judicial powers. This approach, however, remains susceptible
to the criticism that the granting of adjudicatory power to adminis-
trative agencies is typically reviewed de novo by the judiciary.47 The
Act, however, specifically states that no substantive rights are cre-
ated by its provisions and apparently attempts to withhold from ag-
grieved citizens or executive branch officials the opportunity to ob-
tain judicial review of a Commission ultra vires determination. 8
Therefore, the Act lacks the fundamental element that has validated
agency exercise of adjudicatory powers. This would seem to substan-
tially weaken the conclusion that the adjudicative function designed
by Act 19 can be properly performed by the Commission acting as
an executive agency.
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that statutory interpretation (and
application of the efficiency and other criteria) is not a direct and
predominate function of the legislature under the Act. It becomes
46. Section 5(b)(2) also permits the standing committees to evaluate the propriety of
proposed regulations on the basis of other unspecified criteria that they may deem appropriate.
This provision grants a standing committee the power to disapprove a rule based on grounds
potentially more expansive than those available to. the Commission.
47. See generally Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldridge, 624 F. Supp. 1560 (E.D. Pa. 1986),
rev'd, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987); Adair v. Liquor 'Control Bd., 519 Pa. 103, 546 A.2d 19
(1988); Pennsylvania Commonwealth Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103, 501-08,
701-54 (Purdon Supp. 1989); Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
551-55 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
48. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 2,
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appropriate then to examine whether the legislative power to inter-
pret statutory language, to the degree envisioned by Act 19, in-
fringes upon or usurps the power of the judiciary.
Statutory interpretation traditionally has been one of the core
functions of the judiciary and a power that has been jealously
guarded against legislative incursions.49 This is perhaps best illus-
trated by the evolution of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sions ultimately invalidating expository statutes. These statutes,
widely utilized in Pennsylvania until the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, attempted to control the administration and execu-
tion of existing legislation by directing the judiciary to interpret leg-
islation in the manner prescribed in the expository statute. Prior to
Pennsylvania's adoption of the 1874 constitution, the judiciary had
either fully acquiesced to these legislative commands, or limited
them by giving them only prospective effect. 50 Near the turn of the
century the court completely invalidated the use of expository stat-
utes in a case that remains at the foundation of Pennsylvania consti-
tutional jurisprudence. In Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil
Co. 1 the court held that legislative attempts to direct the judiciary's
interpretation of statutory language were invalid. Although the ac-
tivity at issue was different from the rule review process in that it
involved direct legislative commands to the judiciary, the court's
analysis is highly pertinent to questions raised by rule review under
the Regulatory Review Act.
At issue in Titusville was the Act of June 17, 1887, whose pur-
pose was to change the construction of the Acts of 1836 and 1845 to
broaden the category of Workmen who could file mechanics liens
against property.52 The fashion in which the legislature implemented
49. Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 262-63, 378 A.2d 780, 783-84 (1977). "The
domain of the judiciary is in the field of the administration of justice under the law; it inter-
prets, construes and applies the law." Id. at 262, 378 A.2d at 783 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 322, 145 A. 295, 299 (1929)). "[lI]t necessarily follows that any en-
croachment upon the judicial power by the legislature is offensive to the fundamental scheme
of our government." Id. at 262, 378 A.2d at 783. "It is also true ... that there may be some
areas where the dividing lines between the respective responsibilities of the three branches may
be difficult to define. [But] the fact that the distinctions in some areas may be obscure does not
lessen the responsibility of this Court to be ever vigilant for any encroachment upon the au-
thority of the judicial branch." Id. at 262-63 n.5, 378 A.2d at 783 n.5 (citing Stander v.
Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 422, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (1969)). In very certain terms the legislature has
proclaimed that the legislature may not direct that a statute be construed in a certain way.
"[Tlhe Courts have the power, the duty and the responsibility of interpreting the Constitution
and all legislation. ... Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 422, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (1969).
50. See Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. 22 (1845); Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. 45 (1871).
51. 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917 (1888).
52. Id. at 631, 15 A. at 918.
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this change was not through passage of an act extending the right to
file a mechanics lien to a new class of workers, but rather a direction
to the courts that existing statutes governing the use of mechanics
liens should be construed to permit the filing of liens by a broader
class of individuals than previously had been permitted by judicial
decisions.53 The court invalidated this statute as well as those stat-
utes similarly structured on two grounds. First, the statutes were
held to violate the doctrine of separation of powers and second, they
failed to satisfy the directive of article III, section 6 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. 54
On both accounts, the constitutional infirmities that the court
revealed in the Act of June 17, 1887 arise from structural character-
istics that are shared by the Regulatory Review Act. The core of the
court's analysis prohibits legislative activity that is remarkably simi-
lar to that which is authorized by Act 19. After expressing the belief
that the legislative action at issue was an unmasked attempt to di-
rect the judiciary in its interpretive function, the court, in perhaps its
most descriptive recitation of this doctrine, explained:
Now, the constitution provides in section 6, of article III.,
that "No law shall be revived, amended, extended, or conferred
by a reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived,
amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and pub-
lished at length;" while the act of 1887 extends and confers the
benefits of the acts of 1836 and 1845 to a large class of claim-
ants, without the re-enactment of a single one of the provisions
of the acts so extended, and by a reference to their titles only. It
would be difficult to imagine a plainer violation of the constitu-
tional provision. But this is not the only clause of the constitu-
tion against which the act of 1887 offends. Section 1, of article
V., vests in the clearest manner possible the judicial power of
the commonwealth in the several courts. The legislature can no
more exercise judicial powers than the courts can arrogate to
themselves legislative powers. The legislative and judicial de-
partments of the government are independent and co-ordinate.
The act of 1887 is in no respect a legislative declaration of the
rights and privileges of the class of persons to whom it relates,
but it is a judicial order or decree directed to the courts. It un-
dertakes to give a new and final interpretation to the acts of
53. Id. at 632, 15 A. at 918.
54. Id. at 632-34, 15 A. at 919-20. Article I11, § 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides that "No law shall be revised, amended, extended, or conferred by a reference to its
title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-
enacted and published at length." Id. at 632, 15 A. at 918.
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1836 and 1845, and directs the courts to adopt that interpreta-
tion in all cases that may be before them. Obedience to this or-
der requires an abandonment of a long line of cases, and makes
it incumbent on the courts to declare that a large class of claim-
ants is within the provisions of those statutes which they have
heretofore solemnly adjudged was not within them. To make
this objection still more apparent it may be borne in mind that
the act of 1887 is not an expository statute following upon the
heels of that which it seeks to explain, but that it refers to a law
which has been on the statute book for over half a century, and
the meaning of which has been long and well settled by the
courts; and it attempts to overturn the judicial construction
given to its provisions, and to force upon the courts the new one
which it furnishes ready made. This is a clear case of the exer-
cise of judicial powers by a department of the government that
does not possess them, and is a violation of Article V., section 1,
of the constitution.5
Under the constitution, as it stood prior to 1874, the limits
within which legislative power was to be exercised were not as
closely drawn as they now are. Many things were then permissi-
ble, as to the character and form of legislation, which the pre-
sent constitution plainly forbids. Expository statutes, and stat-
utes directing the courts what construction should be given to
previous legislation were not uncommon prior to 1874, and the
courts, while pronouncing all such legislation to be judicial in its
character and void as to any retroactive effect intended, yet
sought to give effect to the legislative will however expressed as
to future cases. As the constitution prescribed no form or order
into which the legislative expression was to be cast, the court
sought to give effect to the purpose, however expressed. But the
constitution of 1874, section 6, of article III., already referred
to, requires all statutes to be self-explanatory and complete in
their provisions, and forbids the extension, amendment, revival,
or the use of any other method of conferring the benefits of pre-
vious legislation short of a re-enactment at length. This effectu-
ally closes the old and well-worn short-cut route, and we cannot,
no matter how much inclined we might be to do so, give effect,
even as to future cases, to expository acts like that under consid-
eration. They are void as an unauthorized exercise of judicial
power, and they are void becuase of the infraction of section 6 of
article III.56
55. Id. at 632-33, 15 A. at 918-19.
56. Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 633-34, 15 A. 917, 919
(1888).
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The command of Titusville has not been diminished, and the court
has continued to defend the judicial prerogative, ruling on various
occasions that the legislature may not properly constrain or direct
the judiciary in its interpretation of statutory language.57
On several fronts, the types of legislative efforts that are disfa-
vored by Titusville and its progeny are the primary gears driving the
rule review mechanism. The activity that those cases seek to prohibit
is legislative interference with the judiciary through laws ordering
that statutes be interpreted in a certain manner.
Act 19 arguably commits the same infraction in a more direct
and imposing fashion. Rather than issuing a direct order to the judi-
ciary that a statute should be construed in a particular fashion, the
Act takes that approach a step further by circumventing the judici-
ary and allowing the legislature itself to interpret statutory meaning.
Sections 5(b)(2), (d), and (e) permit the legislature, in conjunction
with or through the Commission, to consider and analyze the follow-
ing factors: statements offered by members of the legislature; histori-
cal evidence of legislative intent; the words of the statute; and perti-
nent judicial decisions. Based on an analysis of these factors, the
legislature may then decide whether the statute gives the agency au-
thority to promulgate the regulation in question, and on that basis
disapprove or approve the regulation. 8
Additionally, the style and mechanics of the prohibited exposi-
tory statute are strikingly similar to the resolution process through
which the legislature asserts its will under Act 19. Like the exposi-
tory statute disapproved in Titusville, the concurrent resolution dis-
approving an agency regulation does not purport to modify or amend
the agency's enabling statute-although it does move toward the sta-
tus of proper legislation through its presentment to the Governor.
Descriptively, it is a direct order that a particular regulation is dis-
approved and shall not be promulgated. 9 In effect, it is the vehicle
of enforcement of the legislature's determination that the disap-
57. See Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 264, 378 A.2d 780, 783 (1977); Stander
v. Kelly, 433 Pa. 406, 424, 250 A.2d 474, 483 (1969); Leahey v. Farrel, 362 Pa. 52, 56, 66
A.2d 577, 579 (1949); Dauphin Co. Grand Jury Investigation Procedure (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342,
356, 2 A.2d 802, 808-09 (1938).
58. Roughly the same issue has been faced by the judiciary in other states, resulting in
the conclusion that legislative interpretation of existing statutes under the auspices of agency
rule review was an usurpation of the power of the judiciary and thus invalid. See, e.g., Legisla-
tive Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984).
59. See, e.g., H.R. 258, Printer's No. 3102 (Pa. 1988) and S. Con. Regulatory Review
Res. 1, Printer's No. 694 (Pa. 1988), barring promulgation of regulations of the Department
of Environmental Resources on erosion and sediment pollution control published at 18 Pa.
Bull. 1029 (Mar. 12, 1988).
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proved regulation is ultra vires (or is unwise when measured against
the efficiency criteria of Act 19). In the face of an unimpaired ena-
bling statute that serves as a grant of authority to the agency to
promulgate the regulation, the resolution takes on a curious status.
The resolution does not purport to set policy or prevent essentially
the same regulation from being reintroduced under another label.
Moreover, at least for those regulations that are not deemed ultra
vires (and arguably even for these, depending of the view one takes
of the validity of the legislative ultra vires determination) the resolu-
tion does not dispute the agency's statutory authority to issue the
rule.
These characteristics place the presented resolution in an odd
quasi-legislative posture. The validity of such a resolution is dubious
as a mechanism for implementing legislative modifications of an ex-
isting statute. This is especially so in light of the commitment in
Sessoms that "to the extent that a statute establishes governmental
policy, the legislature may not further control the execution of that
policy except through legislation."60
In at least two respects, however, Act 19's concurrent resolution
provision diverges from the structure of the expository statute. The
first distinction between an expository statute and an Act 19 resolu-
tion is that the latter does not, on its face, purport to broadly con-
strue the meaning of the enabling statute."' Rather, it is tailored to
the precise regulation it affects, and thus, does not prohibit the
agency from proposing or promulgating the same, or a similar regu-
lation, in a separate future process. There is some superficial appeal
to the point that the limitation on the impact of the resolution to a
specific regulation, rather than the overall authority of the agency
under the enabling statute, distinguishes it sufficiently from a judi-
cial ultra vires decision that the Act 19 process can be considered
decidedly nonjudicial in nature.62 This argument survives, however,
only when the focus remains on the precise form of the legislative
action and the resolution document. True, the resolution in precise
terms applies only to a specific regulation. As a practical matter,
however, a successful legislative disapproval of a particular regula-
tion will likely be as effective a prohibition on future promulgation of
60. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 374, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (1987).
61. See supra note 59.
62. This argument is double edged. Since the legislature's decision is specifically tailored
to a single regulation, the analysis moves away from the classification of valid legislative poli-
cymaking into the arena of interference with the details of executive agency enforcement of
legislative enactments. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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the same or similar regulation as would be any court decision. In-
deed, in light of the subtle variations in facts and circumstances that
can generate different outcomes in broadly equivalent judicial pro-
ceedings, the legislative disapproval of a particular regulation, with
all the implicit messages that accompany it, might serve as an even
broader and more static prevention against future similar regulations
than would judicial disfavor.6 3 This is especially true in light of the
powers of appropriation and potential modification of the enabling
statute that the legislature may always exert to control agency
action.
The second distinction between the structure of the expository
statute and that of rule review is that the resolution expressing the
legislative disapproval of the regulation might not explicitly indicate
that the basis for the decision is the legislative determination that
the regulation is ultra vires. This allows the argument that the offi-
cial statement implementing the legislature's decision of disapproval
does not refer to or purport to interpret any existing statute, but
rather is simply a valid implementation of legislative resolve that the
agency should not take certain actions. This position, however, ig-
nores the fact that the legislature's view that a rule is ultra vires is
indeed communicated through operation of section 5(b)(3). More-
over, the statute itself boldly professes that the legislature's purpose
when construing the meaning of agency enabling statutes is to deter-
mine whether proposed agency regulations exceed the powers dele-
gated. 4 This statement, combined with the fact that the agency has
received both a statement interpreting the parameters of its enabling
statute,6 5 and an order, stemming from that interpretation, that a
proposed regulation shall not be promulgated, place the legislature's
action on par with the impact and procedure of interpretive actions
normally undertaken by the judiciary. 6
63. A case in point at the federal level is the agency reaction to the decision in Ameri-
can Mining Congress v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The decision had the effect
of limiting the agency's power to regulate otherwise hazardous materials that were being re-
cycled. Almost immediately, the agency response was to narrowly interpret the decision, spark-
ing a debate that the agency had failed to give proper credence to the court's ruling. See
Current Developments, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 202 (June 10, 1988); Current Developments, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 263 (June 24, 1988). Given the noncombative disposition of the judiciary
toward the other branches, this response by the agency entailed little risk. One can project,
however, that if the statement made by the court had come from the Congress through a
mechanism like that established in Act 19, it would have produced a much more submissive
agency response.
64. See Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 2 (Preamble).
65. Id. § 5(b)(3).
66. In addition, this position would remain subject to the attack that even conceding
that no legislative statutory interpretation has occurred, the resolution may still contradict
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The similarity between the prohibited expository statute and the
Act 19 resolution process continues with both concepts' failure to
satisfy the command of article III, section 6 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.6 7 Section 6 requires that any amendment or modifica-
tion of an existing statute can only occur if the amended provision is
reenacted and published at length. 8 The expository statute violated
this provision by attempting to affect the rights and responsibilities
extended under existing legislation without specifically amending or
modifying the language of that legislation."9 Similarly, the Act 19
resolution process directly impacts the ability of executive agency of-
ficers to enforce and administer the law in accordance with the man-
date of an existing enabling statute, and yet does not amend or mod-
ify the statute. Although it is possible to argue that the agency has
no such mandate when it acts beyond the authority granted by the
statute (ignoring for the moment the arguable impropriety of the
legislature making the determination) it remains true that the Act
also permits the legislature to disapprove regulations that are un-
questionably authorized by the enabling statute. In those cases, dis-
approval is based on the conclusion that the regulation is simply un-
wise as measured against the efficiency criteria listed in section 5(e),
or on some other basis, as anticipated by section 5(c).
B. Impact on the Judiciary's Authority to Resolve Disputes Be-
tween Branches of Government
The powers of the judiciary are not solely defined in terms of
the authority to interpret statutes, but also by the court's authority
to resolve disputes between the branches of government.7 0 One po-
tential result of Act 19 is to give the legislature plenary power to
resolve disputes with the executive over the scope of the enforcement
policy decisions contained in existing legislation and impair the powers vested in the agency
without satisfying the constitutional requirements for valid lawmaking. See infra notes 74-85
and accompanying text.
67. Although Titusville was decided under the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, the
language of article Ill, § 6 which appeared in that document was carried over into the current
constitution, adopted in 1968.
68. PA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
69. See Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917 (1888). See
also supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
70. See Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 261-62, 378 A.2d 780, 782-83 (1977)
(quoting Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Procedure (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342, 352-53, 2
A.2d 802, 807 (1938)) ("Accordingly, when the Constitution of 1873 was adopted, the people
acted in the light of generations of experience with the operation of the doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers, and with the resulting necessity for judicial review to resolve differences of
opinion between the legislative, executive or judicial departments concerning the scope and
extent of the delegated powers.").
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and rulemaking authority granted by a particular enabling statute.
Even a cursory examination of the relationship between the leg-
islature and the executive agency reveals that invocation of the rule
review mechanism stems from a direct conflict between the legisla-
ture and executive branches. It has been widely observed that, even
absent statutes providing for legislative review of agency actions, the
legislature possesses various and wide ranging informal methods of
controlling agency action and shaping executive agency rules. 71
Given this reality, it is apparent that in cases in which the formal
mechanism for legislative disapproval of a regulation is exercised,
these informal methods of control have failed. Thus, there most
likely exists substantial conflict and disagreement between the legis-
lature and the executive branch administrative agency (and perhaps
the chief executive) about the range of power entrusted to the partic-
ular agency by the enabling statute.72 As currently structured, the
rule review statute equips the legislature with plenary authority to
resolve these conflicts in its favor by disapproving the disputed rule
and overriding any veto of that decision by the Governor. 73 Since the
power to resolve conflicts between the branches of government is one
71. See, e.g., Hamilton & Prince, supra note 37, at 248 (Control can be exercised
through a number of mechanisms including submission of detailed committee reports to the
agency explaining legislative expectations, committee oversight hearings, legislative investiga-
tions, and statutory provisions (similar to the Pennsylvania Sunset statute) which provide that
designated agencies must cease operation after a specified period unless they are reauthorized
by legislative action); see also Note, The Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar-Alive
and Kicking, 40 VAND. L. REV. 903, 920 (1987) (the legislative control over appropriations is
an obvious and significant instrument through which the legislature may exert control over the
executive agency and a lever that may be used to enforce legislative rulemaking preferences).
Furthermore, the ever present possibility that the legislature will amend the enabling stat-
ute lends substantial weight to the expressed wishes of individual lawmakers and especially to
members of the legislative body who are charged in some fashion with responsibility for a
particular agency or area of regulation. Id. at 920.
72. Although one can conceive of a system in which legislative guidance to an agency
regarding an ambiguous statute would be viewed as welcome explanation to an administrative
subordinate about an unclear passage in the law, the reality of the American structure of
lawmaking, with its designed interaction between the legislative and the executive branches, is
much different. There will very often be a significant degree of conflict and compromise be-
tween the legislature and the executive over the content of proposed laws. Concessions may be
made by the executive precisely because of the potential to exercise some level of control in the
execution phase. If the legislature, through the mechanism of rule review and the potential for
veto override, retains absolute control over execution by controlling agency regulation, the leg-
islature maintains absolute authority to resolve these conflicts. This power shifts the legisla-
ture's relationship with the executive out of balance, and removes the courts from their consti-
tutionally designated position as arbiter of interbranch conflicts.
73. Although the statute provides for presentment, the option of the legislature to over-
ride any veto gives the legislature complete power to prevail in any such disputes when it
possesses the requisite resolve. The legislative assumption of this power has the potential to
introduce even greater inefficiencies and rigidity into the lawmaking process by diminishing the
ability of the executive to compromise on issues that may impede the passage of new legisla-
tion. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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of the fundamental powers of the judiciary, the validity of the legis-
lative effort to independently resolve this category of conflicts with
executive branch is highly questionable. Although the separation of
powers doctrine presents no plain seams along which functions of the
separate branches can be rigidly defined, resolution of interbranch
conflicts, especially over the meaning of legislation, would appear to
fall at the core of the judiciary's power. Other than political expedi-
ency, which has been largely discounted as a justification for dimin-
ishing the protections enforced by the separation of powers doc-
trine,74 there is little to recommend or justify the type of intrusion
that is inherent in Act 19.
C. Legislative Inability to Fairly Interpret Statutory Intent
An additional indicator of the dubious propriety of the legisla-
ture's license to interpret statutory intent rises from the body of law
prescribing the fashion in which the judiciary shall interpret statutes.
As American jurisprudence has evolved, the courts have developed
an evaluative system and structure aimed at achieving fair and ob-
jective interpretations of legislative enactments. 75 The process seeks
to ensure that to the degree possible, the policies set in place by the
body that drafted the words of the statute are respected and en-
forced until they are amended or modified in a subsequent legislative
session.
Arguably, this essential facet of the interpretive process cannot
exist when the task of statutory interpretation is undertaken by the
legislature. Due to its design, the legislative process for gleaning
statutory intent is inadequate to achieve the goal of fair interpreta-
tion of existing statutes. Although returning to the source of law-
making to determine the meaning of laws may appear quite sensible
initially, the folly of that approach is quickly revealed upon a closer
examination of the nature of legislation and the legislature.
74. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
("[Tlhe fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks--of democratic
government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional
veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
the executive and independent agencies ...."); United States v. Brown, 690 F. Supp. 1423,
1428 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951) ("The hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accom-
plish desirable objectives, must be resisted."). But see Chadha, 462 U.S. at 998-1002 (White,
J., dissenting).
75. See generally Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, re-
printed in 3A, N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 165 (4th ed. 1986).
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The legislature is a fluid, changing body. Its overall direction
and the policy views of individual legislators and their mandates
change with the tides of the political process. Once the legislative
body that enacts a particular statute passes out of session, the Gen-
eral Assembly is perhaps one of the last places one could reasonably
expect to find an objective interpretation of the language of the stat-
ute that would respect the intent of those who drafted and enacted
it. Indeed, it may be difficult to obtain a legislative consensus about
statutory meaning even at the moment the vote occurs, given the
purposeful ambiguity of legislation that often results from the com-
promises necessary to pass a bill into law.
Members of a different legislative session cannot be expected to
subordinate their own current views about the meaning and wisdom
of an existing statute to some objectively derived view of the intent
of the body that originally enacted it. Indeed, failure by a legislator
to use every legitimate means made available to further the interests
of his constituency, including the Act 19 provisions for legislative
statutory interpretation, might be a basis for criticism of his per-
formance as a representative.76 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that legislative interpretations of existing enabling statutes will be
controlled by prevailing political attitudes and that legislative inter-
pretations of statutory meaning will adhere to any discoverable in-
tent of the enacting legislature only by coincidence.77
Thus, if any lasting effect is to attach to legislative enactments,
there must exist an interpretive body designed to be objective and
apolitical, and which will attribute fair meaning to statutory lan-
guage based on reasoned criteria. The judiciary is precisely such a
body. Despite the often levied criticisms of its political nature, the
judiciary's ability to fill the role of arbiter of statutory meaning is
immeasurably greater than that of the legislature.
III. The Disapproval Mechanism and its Potential for Intrusion
into the Executive Function
Two of the basic objections to pre-Chadha legislative rule re-
view mechanisms were that they permitted improper legislative con-
76. The provision in section 5(d) of Act 19 prescribing that current statements of mem-
bers of the legislature may be considered in the determination of statutory intent presents
members of the body with a direct opportunity to affect current interpretation given to previ-
ously enacted statutes.
77. See Farina, supra note 26, at 476-99 (Professor Farina provides a thoughtful analy-
sis of the danger of continuing statutory amendment through interpretation at the federal
level).
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trol over the executive branch through an instrument other than the
lawmaking process and that absent a legislative change in the ena-
bling statute that modified or clarified the authority or mandate of
the agency, legislative interference with the executive function of
rule promulgation was an impermissible intrusion into the executive
domain.78
In Sessoms, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the
validity of these criticisms and adopted much of the Chadha ration-
ale, ruling that legislative control over executive agency rulemaking
could only occur through properly enacted legislation.79 Partly in re-
sponse to this decision, the Regulatory Review Act was amended to
include the requirement that legislative resolutions disapproving par-
ticular agency rules be presented to the Governor for approval or
veto.80 Whether this process satisfies the prescription of Sessoms has
gone untested. However, because of its unusual character, this "leg-
islation," which was designed to validate legislative rule review
under Act 19, may indeed be inadequate to overcome criticisms that
the legislature continues to intrude improperly into the executive
function."1
In light of Sessoms' designation of agency rulemaking as an ex-
ecutive function, and its prescription that the legislature shall only
78. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 976 n.12 (listing commentary generally unfavorable to the
legislative veto).
79. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 374, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (1987).
80. See IRRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
81. The Pennsylvania Constitution, with specifically enumerated exceptions, prescribes
legislation as the only mechanism through which the legislature may directly impact persons
and entities outside the legislative body. PA. CONST. art. I11, § I.
At the federal level, attempts to permit legislative control over agencies through instru-
ments short of lawmaking are supported by the argument that administrative agencies are
involved in more than administration and enforcement and that pursuant to enabling statutes
almost completely devoid of standards or policy guidance, agencies are exercising quasi-legisla-
tive power. See Farina supra note 26, at 483-88. This criticism is supported in part by the
manner of application of the federal nondelegation doctrine, which lends a good level of sup-
port to advocates of the need for mechanisms permitting some measure of legislative control
over the legislative or quasi-legislative functions of executive agencies. See, e.g., Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
Although this approach to controlling agencies that are perceived to have run wild may be
a sensible response, in light of an apparent inadequacy of traditional judicial and legislative
controls at the federal level, the approach is less supportable in Pennsylvania.
Due perhaps to a more rigorous application of the state nondelegation doctrine, see, e.g.,
Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487 (1980), and a more
manageable quantity of matters requiring legislative attention, statutory controls on agency
action have been more restricted.
While it may be a fantasy when applied at the federal level, the concept of a fairly clear
boundary between lawmaking and execution has been maintained in Pennsylvania. "Notwith-
standing the view that such regulations are adopted under a delegation of the legislative power
to the agency, administrative rulemaking may be viewed as entirely executive in nature." Ses-
soms, 516 Pa. at 374, 532 A.2d at 779.
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act through traditional legislative mechanisms, legislative efforts
under Act 19 to control the process must be closely evaluated,8" and
are open to criticisms on more than one front.
As noted above, the "legislation" that is enacted to disapprove
an agency rule is of an unusual character. By definition, it is a con-
current resolution that is presented to the Governor for approval. It
does not purport to either amend the statute under which the agency
draws its authority or to express a continuing policy that similar or
indeed precisely the same regulation shall not be promulgated in the
future.
Sessoms and the concepts that it draws from Chadha appear to
require that in order to impair agency power granted by statute, that
statute must be amended, superseded, modified, or somehow ad-
justed to remove or change the policy that initially entrusted specific
powers to the agency. The analysis in Sessoms of federal cases in
this area is illuminating. In describing what it views to be the core
principle guiding the federal and its own assessment of the validity
of legislative oversight, the court quoted from the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar:83 "[o]nce [the legisla-
ture] makes its choice enacting legislation, its participation ends. [It]
can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indi-
rectly-by passing new legislation."84
This passage suggests that legislative control over executive
agency rulemaking requires more than presentment to the executive
of a legislative resolution which has not modified the enabling stat-
ute. This construction is supported by the position that an existing
statute, which permits the promulgation of regulations that might be
deemed inefficient and disapproved under Act 19, represents a deci-
sion by the enacting body that the described inefficiencies are an ac-
ceptable cost of achieving the statutory goal. Viewed through this
lense, legislative control of agency rulemaking must involve a change
in the statute that, in some fashion, overcomes existing policy choices
in favor of new ones. On this score, the current rule review process
fails.
Furthermore, if the statement that the legislature may control
agency rulemaking only through "new legislation" actually refers to
82. The Sessoms case is fairly clear in its requirement that the legislature cannot,
through a one house or two house veto, interfere or prohibit executive agency action. Sessoms,
56 Pa. at 375, 532 A.2d at 780.
83. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
84. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 374, 532 A.2d 775, 779-80 (1987) (quoting
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)).
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legislation in the traditional sense, then the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion comes directly into play. Article III, section 1 of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed except by
bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage
through either House, as to change its original purpose."85 The Act
19 process, utilizing a concurrent legislative resolution, does not sat-
isfy this provision86 or attendant sections that require, for example,
that no bill shall be approved unless it is considered in each house
for three concurrent days prior to passage.8"
Further indications that the Act 19 quasi-legislative process of
disapproving regulations is constitutionally deficient grow from the
tension between this process and article III, section 6 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. This section requires that the portion of a statute
that is amended or modified shall be republished at length.8 8 The
resolutions of disapproval under Act 19, however, are not subject to
this process. Although the resolutions prevent the exercise of powers
that are granted by an existing statute, they fail to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirement for legislation that amends or modifies an ex-
isting statute. This reinforces the view that disapproval resolutions
under Act 19 reside in a nether world located somewhere between
conventional resolutions, which typically do not undergo presentment
and do not gain the status of law, and traditional legislation, which
directly addresses existing laws whose directives it overturns.8 9
85. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
86. McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 164 A.2d 424 (1960)
[T]he differences between laws and resolutions are fundamental. A law is a bill
that has been passed by a majority of the members of both Houses of the Gen-
eral Assembly and has either been signed by the Governor or has not been acted
upon by him within the time prescribed by the Constitution after its passage by
the legislature, or if it has been vetoed by the Governor, has again been passed
by both Houses with an approving vote of at least two-thirds of the members of
each House. Resolutions, on the other hand, may be adopted by either one, or
both, of the Houses of the General Assembly and do not require the Governor's
signature or approval to validate them and are not subject to veto by the Gover-
nor . . . .[T]his court, in pointing out the difference between a law and a reso-
lution, said: "Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution provides: 'No law shall
be passed except by Bill and no Bill shall be so altered, or amended, on its
passage through either House, as to change its original purpose . . . .' When the
Constitution provided that "no law shall be passed except by bill," it meant by a
"form or draft of a law submitted to the legislature for enactment;" it did not
recognize a mere "formal expression of opinion" as adequate to the creation of a
law."
Id. at 320-21, 164 A.2d at 430.
87. PA. CONST. art. 1II, § 4.
88. PA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
89. Although Act 19 anticipates that some regulations will be disapproved because their
impact ranges beyond the legislative view of delegated authority, disapproval is permitted also
at a second level when the legislature perceives that the regulation fails to meet the efficiency
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Thus characterized, the resolutions passed pursuant to Act 19
cannot be viewed as new legislation amending the policy decisions of
a previous session. Instead, they emerge as hybrid direct orders to
the executive agency, seeking validity through the addition of the
presentment requirement. The indications are that a valid modifica-
tion of an existing grant of authority and constitutionally valid legis-
lative control over agency rulemaking require more than this.
IV. The Policy Implications of Rule Review Under Act 19
Aside from constitutional concerns over the rule review process,
its failure to provide for legislative action directly addressing the
pertinent enabling statute raises questions about its wisdom as a tool
of governmental policy. Since the legislative disapproval process does
not amend or modify the enabling statute, it falls subject to many of
the same criticisms that have been leveled against earlier renditions
of legislative rule review-e.g., direct one or two house vetos which
made no attempt to comply with the requirements for passing new
legislation.
One criticism that remains relevant is that Act 19 complicates
the mechanics of the rulemaking process so that it is clouded to the
detriment of all but the most adept observers.90 Some commentators
have argued that any rule review short of new legislation increases
the disparity of power between the astute special interests and the
general public because the selection of the rules reviewed and the
ultimate outcome of the process may be largely affected by lobbyists.
This outcome is further subject to criticism because this type of ex
parte influence on the process is inconsistent with rulemaking pol-
standards described in the statute or is deemed deficient on some other basis as anticipated by
§ 5(b)(2). Disapproval of regulations in this category appears to directly prohibit agency ac-
tion that undisputedly is authorized by the enabling statute. While the legislature might legiti-
mately apply these efficiency criteria to predesignated or all newly promulgated regulations,
that is not what has occurred under Act 19. Instead, the legislature has authorized itself and
its surrogate to apply these criteria to selected proposed regulations (as distinct from all regu-
lations proposed by a particular department or under a certain statute) and validated that
action through ostensibly legislative action that does not impair the authority granted to the
agency by its enabling legislation.
90. See, e.g., Horan, Adjusting the Separation of Powers: The "Legislative Veto" and
the United States Supreme Court's Decision in the Chadha Case, 14 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 205
(1985). Although it is true that those with access to informed lawyers and astute lobbyists may
successfully navigate the rulemaking maze, those whose resources and sophistication limit
them to commenting formally or informally on proposed rules may be daunted by the addi-
tidnal layer of decisionmaking brought on by Act 19. In all likelihood these persons will be
barred access to the instruments that control the informal process of compromise and accom-
modation between the legislature and the agency. This takes on a much greater significance
due to the presence of Act 19.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1990
icy." While it is true that even absent Act 19, some legislative con-
trol over rulemaking may be exerted, the provisions of the Act ad-
vance the impact of that control, giving the legislature essentially
plenary power over the outcome of the process. In essence, this
grants the legislature the ultimate trump card with which to infor-
mally force rule modifications. Under such conditions, the rulemak-
ing procedure, pursuant to which the public has theoretically been
granted an opportunity for input, arguably becomes an empty ges-
ture, with the true instruments of control shrouded in the mist of
hallway compromises under the pressure of legislative disapproval.
Moreover, with this increased power ceded to the legislature,
the admonitions of individual powerful legislators about the direction
of rulemaking are more likely to be heeded, with the result that a
relatively few members of the legislature might substantially impact
rulemaking on particular issues. 92 While it is true that every rule
proposed by a state agency is submitted to the Commission for anal-
ysis,9" the Commission's decision to focus on a particular rule is dis-
cretionary. In light of the Commission's potential status as a legisla-
tive agency, it is not unreasonable to believe that the influence of
individual legislators also might be wielded to affect the rules chosen
by the Commission for review.
Furthermore, due to the mystery surrounding rule review, and
the less public nature of the concurrent resolutions that disapprove
the regulations, the antidemocratic tendencies that are perhaps an
inherent part of rulemaking are aggravated. This is manifested ini-
tially in an increased lack of accountability to the polity for the re-
sults of rulemaking. One commentator has argued that permitting
the legislature to control rulemaking justifies not only applauding it
for controlling excessive rulemaking, but also holding it directly ac-
countable for permitting the promulgation of unwise regulations.94
From this viewpoint, the Act 19 rule review process can be criticized
because it is not designed to permit the public to discern a clear trail
of responsibility toward those legislators who voted on resolutions to
approve or disapprove the regulation and are still in office when the
ill effects of that decision are felt. The disapproval process remains
91. See Comment, Legislative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: A Constitutional
Analysis, 1985 ARIz. ST. L.J. 493, 499; Atloff & Greig, Democracy, Judicial Review, and the
Legislative Veto, 7 GLENDALE L. REV. 53, 60 (1985).
92. Atloff & Greig, supra note 91, at 78.
93. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 5(a).
94. See Rosenthal, Legislative Oversight and the Balance of Power in State Govern-
ment, 56 STATE GOV'T 90 (1983).
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ambiguous enough that legislators may concurrently take credit for
popular regulations, claim victories over unpopular ones, and con-
tinue to cast the blame on the agency when a regulation that has
been "approved" later falls subject to criticism. As a result, the ac-
countability that is so important in our governmental structure is
impaired.95
Accountability for governmental policy is further clouded be-
cause now the legislature can, without overturning a popular statute
or even acknowledging opposition, effectively repeal or subvert the
statute by controlling its interpretation and execution.96 Moreover,
as currently structured, the resolution process, perhaps unwisely,
limits the interplay between the legislature and executive in the law-
making process. Lawmaking is a process of compromise and conces-
sions. Given the executive's veto power over proposed legislation, the
executive's inclination and capacity to compromise is an important
element in the efficient enactment of legislation. The ability of the
executive to compromise is undoubtedly affected by the options
available to it, particularly the executive's capacity to control the
execution of that policy. However, if the executive's control over en-
forcement through the use of rulemaking is usurped by the legisla-
ture, the executive loses a significant measure of flexibility and, as a
result, must hold out for statutory language much closer to the pol-
icy desired. Indeed, since such language is also subject to enforceable
interpretation by the legislature in subsequent disputes over statu-
tory intent, the executive must in every significant case demand the
clearest achievable statement of policy that approximates the execu-
tive's own viewpoint. It is doubtful that such an extremely inflexible
attitude can lead to efficient or flexible lawmaking.
Finally, the efficient administration of governmental policy is
impaired by Act 19-style rule review because of its reactive nature.
There is significant merit to the argument that a process that per-
mits the massive expenditure of publicly funded time, effort, and re-
sources, and that evaluates the wisdom and efficiency of the rule only
after it has reached the final stages in the rulemaking process, is
inefficient and thus suspect under its own terms.9 7
95. The professed aim of these types of efforts is enhancement of accountability and
control over agency bureaucracy. However, these efforts might also fairly be characterized as
fallout from a struggle over who-the legislature or the executive-will control them, not
whether they will be controlled.
. 96. See Farina, supra note 26, at 500. Professor Farina's observation that "the prospect
that regulatory statutes will routinely be amended or even repealed by 'interpretation' should
at least give us pause" is indeed an understatement. Id.
97. There are potential solutions to this problem. One that is promising in theory is the
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V. Conclusion
The constitutional weaknesses in the framework of Act 19 are
numerous and significant enough to call into question the Act's con-
tinued viability. These flaws emerge from an apparent legislative de-
sire for a direct and speedy method of controlling details of adminis-
trative agency actions. The alternatives of relinquishing control over
the disapproval process to a truly independent or traditional execu-
tive agency, or of utilizing the traditional legislative process to con-
trol agency activities appear to be unpalatable. Absent some notable
change in the scope of the constitutional powers granted to the legis-
lature, however, its pursuit of the goals that appear to have gener-
ated Act 19 will perhaps inevitably fail to pass constitutional muster.
idea of awarding to the agency a shadow budget that authorizes it to impose only a limited
amount of costs on the Commonwealth in a particular year. This could force agency efficiency
in setting its regulatory agenda and satisfy the concerns over costs imposed by overzealous
regulators. Indeed, the current legislation requires these types of calculations to be made by
the agency. Regulatory Review Act, supra note 2, at § 5(a)(4)-(6). Quantification might be
sensibly administered even after the passage of the budget year to avoid delays in policy imple-
mentation, with deficits or surpluses carried over to subsequent years.
